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ADJUDICATION OF SOcIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS BY
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA:
WALKING THE TIGHTROPE BETWEEN ACTIVISM AND
DEFERENCE?
PROFESSOR AVINASH GOVINDJEE*

The prominent presenceof South Africa in discussions on the adjudication
of socio-economic rights can be attributed to two principal reasons one,
-

the absence of any constitutional distinction between these rights and civil
and political rights, and two, their acceptance as being fundamental and
justiciable.African courts, particularlythe ConstitutionalCourt which is the
highest court of the land, have been central to the moulding and evolution of
these sanctions,a role which becomes more appreciablewhen contextualised
with the country's relativelypoor socio-economic development. This article
presents a snapshot of some of the landmark contributions made by the
ConstitutionalCourt in thisfield through which the authorsheds light on
the complex balancing act undertaken by the Court. In the backdrop of the
principle of separation of powers., the author also illustrates the interplay
that is seen between the Court's activist and deferential dispositions and
resultantemerging tensions between the executive and judiciary.
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Adjudication of Socio-Economic Rights by the ConstitutionalCourt of South Africa

I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was introduced to heal the
divisions of the past and to establish a society based on democratic values, social
justice and fundamental human rights. Boldly, it proclaims the desire to improve
the quality of life of all citizens and the need to free the potential of each person
living in the country. The Bill of Rights represents the cornerstone of the South
African constitutional project, enshrining the rights of all people and affirming the
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom, upon which the country
has been founded post-transition. 2 Crucially, the drafters of the Constitution
resisted the temptation to separate and distinguish between civil and political
rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic rights, on the other. Recognising
that these groups of rights are inherently linked and mutually supportive, the
Constitution provides for an expansive range of socio-economic rights as part of
the Bill of Rights. Unlike the Constitution of India, such rights are justiciable in
South Africa, despite having been challenged, at the time of their inclusion, as being
rights which have not been universally accepted as fundamental and because of
their perceived inconsistency with the notion of separation of powers In particular,
objectors argued that inclusion of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights in
the Constitution would result in courts dictating the government how the budget
should be allocated. In rejecting such assertions, the Constitutional Court held as
4
follows in the Certificationjudgment:
It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result in
courts making orders which have direct implications for budgetary
matters. However, even when a court enforces civil and political rights
such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, the
order it makes will often have such implications. A court may require
the provision of legal aid, or the extension of state benefits to a class
of people who formerly were not beneficiaries of such benefits. In

1

2
3

Preamble, CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIc OF Soun AFIRICA, 1996

see, Jeff King, JuDcnc SOCIAiL

4

[Hereinafter, "the

Constitution"].
Section 7 read with Section 1, CONSTIUTION.
See e.g., Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, [19961
ZACC 26; 1996(4) SA 744 (CC); 1996(10) BCLR 1253 (CC) 77. For a useful summary
of the history of the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution, including a
discussion regarding the key objections against such inclusion, see, Eric Christianson.
Adjudicating non justiciable rights:Socio-economic rights and the South African Constitutional
Court 38 CoUMBIA HUMAN Ricrrs Law RuviW 321 (2007), For an argument as to why,
under the right conditions, constitutionalising social rights may advance social ju stice.
Id.

RIGHTS

(2012).
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our view it cannot be said that by including socio-economic rights
within a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon the courts so different
from that ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill of rights, that it
results in a breach of the separation of powers ...
we are of the view
that these rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable.
The Constitutional Court accordingly concluded that the fact that socioeconomic rights would almost inevitably give rise to budgetary implications
was not a bar to their justiciability. At the very least, according to the Court,
socio-economic rights could be negatively protected from improper invasion.5
The effect of the decision in the Certification judgment was that socio-economic
rights to education, 6 access to land and housing7 health care, food, water and
social security, including, if people are unable to support themselves and their
dependants, appropriate social assistance, 8were interspersed with other (civil and
political) rights in the Bill of Rights.
This landmark inclusion of socio-economic rights as justiciable 'fundamental
rights was not without limitation. With a few notable exceptions, the State was
only directed to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these socio-economic rights. 9
In addition, the general limitations clause of the Constitution confirms that "Te

rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law ofgeneralapplication to the
extent that the limitation is reasonableand justifiable in an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors
...1 Beyond such limitations, the legislature, executive, judiciary and all organs
of State are bound by the Bill of Rights, which applies to all laws," and the State
must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.2

5

Supra note 3

6

Section 29, CONSTITUTION
Sections 25 and 26, CONSTITUTION.

7
8
9

Section 27, CONSTITUTION.
See e.g., the so-called "internal limitations" contained in sections 26(2) and 27(2),
CONSTITUTION,

10

Section 36,

CONSTITUTION. See also, section 7(3). Relevant factors listed in section 36
include the nature of the right; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; the
nature and extent of the limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose;

and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
11

According to section 2, the Constitution itself proclaims that it is the supreme law of

12

the Republic of South Africa, and that any law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid.
Sections 8(1) and 7(2), CONSTITUTION.

Adjudication of Socio-Economic Rights by the ConstitutionalCourt of South Africa
Such ambitious undertakings must be contextualised against the backdrop
of the reality of the situation in the country, which has been criticised for making
slow progress in terms of addressing job creation, poverty and inequality.
According to the Ipsos survey, for example, less than four in every ten South
Africans are employed on either a full-time or a part-time basis and almost three
in every ten are unemployed and looking for work (the official statistics suggest
that the unemployment figure in South Africa is presently 25.2%). Statistics also
reflect that the position of women in South African society is worse than that of
men." Even basic matters, such as access to water, are problematic in parts of the
country, with only 74.8% of Eastern Cape households enjoying such access in 2011.14
Although official data relating to the decline of absolute poverty and the reduction
of inequality in the country has previously been released (thanks largely to the
large increase in the number of people benefiting from social grants), indicating a
number of positive and improving impacts on poverty, it has been acknowledged
that poverty remains one of South Africa's most serious developmental challenges.15
The employment to population ratio, for example, remains poor (and is worse for
women than for men), resulting in an exceptionally large number of non-working
people depending on each employed person. The effects of a declining GDP have
also apparently affected the poor detrimentally, and income and expenditure
6
remain heavily skewed towards the rich.
People in South Africa who are unable to support themselves or their
dependants (or other interested parties / classes of people) are increasingly turning
to the courts in the hope that the various socio-economic rights contained in the
Constitution may be interpreted in a fashion which will benefit the marginalised.
The response of the courts, in particular the Constitutional Court, has been very
interesting from academic and practical perspectives, and warrants comment and
reflection. Bearing in mind that the judgments emanate from the particular South
African context (including the unique wording of the South African Constitution),
it is nevertheless suggested that the judicial approach to the enforcement of socioeconomic rights in South Africa may hold lessons for jurists in other countries. This
contribution, following some preliminary remarks regarding the characteristics of
activist and deferential judiciaries, briefly discusses some of the key judgments of
13

14
15

16

See, Ipsos Survey, available at http://ipsos-markinor.co.za/news/ipsos-survey-19-yearsafter-democracy-sOuth-africans-still-have-to-deal with-slw-prgress-in-terms- f-j obcreation-unemployment-and-inequality (Last visited on 30 July 2013).
Statistics South Africa, GENERAL HOUSEhOLD SURVEY, 27, 32 (2011).
Republic of South Africa, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: COUNTRY REPORT (2010),
available at http://www.statssa.gov.za/news archive/Docs/MDGR 2010.pdf at37 (Last

visited on 30 July 2013).
Id.
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the South African Constitutional Court in socio-economic rights-related matters.
It critically analyses the approach adopted in the past, also commenting on likely
trends for the future interpretation of these rights.

II. T

JuDIcIARy AN

THE NoTION OF SEPARATION OF PowERs

The judicial authority of South Africa vests in the courts.17 The courts are
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must
apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice)5t An order or decision
issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of State to which it applies. 9
The court system in South Africa is headed by the Constitutional Court, which
consists of a Chief Justice of South Africa, the Deputy Chief Justice and nine other
judgesY The Constitutional Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters.,.
When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court, including the
Constitutional Court, must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent
with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency. A court may
also make any order that is just and equitable."
The separation of powers is an over-arching organising principle in the
exercise of public power in South Africa." As the Deputy Chief Justice of the
country has noted:25

17
18

19
20
21

Section 165(1), CONSTIrUTION.
Section 165(2), CONSTITUTION. Section 165(3) provides that no person or organ of state
may interfere with the functioning of the courts. Section 165(4) provides that organs
of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to
ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the
courts.
Section 165(5), CONSTITUTION.
Section 167(1), CONSTITUTION. An "Office of the Chief Justice" is soon to be established
and will control the administration of the courts.
Section 167(2)(a), CONSTITUTrION. Section 167(4) provides for various matters which only
the Constitutional Court may decide. As per section 167(5) the Constitutional Court
makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of
the President is constitutional.

22

Section 172(1)(a), CONSTrtJTION.

23

Skction 172(b), CONSTITUTION.
Dikgang Moseneke, TransformativeAdjudication in Post-Apartheid South Africa - Taking
StockafteraDecade in P Osode and G Glover(eds.) LAW AND TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE IN
POST-APARTHEID SoUi AFRIcA 26 (2010). For an analysis of the doctrine of separation
of powers, see, Johan 1). Van der Vyver, The Separation of Powers SAPL 177 (1993).
Moseneke, supra note 24, at 26.

24

25
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It subjects all exercise of public power to forensic review by an
independent judiciary, and yet it does not permit unwarranted
judicial incursion in to the domain of parliament or the executive.
In its essence separation of powers is an antidote for tyranny and
abuse of power. Therefore, when the separation of power principle
operates optimally, there should be no trespass by the judiciary into
the domain of the legislature, or by the legislature into the areas set
aside for judicial function.
It is also well-known by now that the function to be performed by judges in
South Africa includes an element of transformative adjudication, 6 requiring that
those in judicial office must embrace the fundamental transition envisioned by
the Constitution.2 7 The courts are, however, well aware that the duty to advance
social justice rests mainly on the State, which carries the duty to protect socioeconomic rights (and other matters) by regulating such rights through legislation
and administrative conduct. In Treatment Action Campaign,2" the Constitutional
Court held, for example, that the government was better placed than the courts to
formulate and implement policy on HIV but that it had failed to adopt a reasonable
measure to achieve the progressive realisation of the right of access to health care
services in accordance with section 27 of the Constitution.
Professor Sandra Liebenberg has noted that the separation of powers doctrine
is particularly liable to be invoked as a rigid device in socio-economic rights
adjudication, allowing courts to avoid making decisions which are perceived to
challenge the authority of the executive and legislative branches of government.29
"This is particularly the case when the doctrine assumes an idealisedform of separate
terrains with strict demarcation between the roles of each branch instead of a functional
and pragmatic device to facilitate responsive, accountable governance" 3M she observes.
According to Liebenberg, such an approach is at odds with South Africa's ideal
of transformative constitutionalism, in terms of which the three branches of
government ought to cooperate in order to facilitate the State's endeavours in
relation to development and redistribution, particularly with reference to socio26
27
28
29
30

Karl Klare, Legal Cultureand TransformativeConstitutionalism14 Souni AFRICAN JOURNAL
ON HUMAN RICHTS 146 (1998).
See e.g., Dikgang Moseneke, The fourth Brain Fisher Memorial Lecture: Transformative
adjudication18 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RICHis 309-319 (2002).
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 200210 BCLR 1033 (CC) [Hereinafter,
"TAC'1.
Sandra Liebenberg, Towards a Transfiormative Adjudication of Socio-Economic Rights in
Osode and Glover (eds.), at 51.
Id, at 52.
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economic rights realisation. 31 The Constitution itself suggests a "flexible and cooperative model of relations between the three branches ofgovernment, involving a mutual
relationship of "accountability,responsiveness and openness".22 As Liebenberg notes,

the appropriate inter-relationship has been described as a constitutional dialogue,
aimed at"
tP]rodding government to be more responsive to the needs of the
poor in order to fulfil their constitutional rights and have access to
economic and social resources and services. Taking this role seriously
will require, in appropriate cases, decisions which have extensive
policy and budgetary implications. However, in other cases, it may
require judicial restraint and deference to the institutional strengths
and skills of the other branches.

Ii.THE JUDGMENTS

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT:

A

BRIEF RECAP

In the few landmark socio-economic rights cases which have come before the

Constitutional Court, the Court's decision- making has been the subject of intense
scrutiny within the country and abroad. The Court's decisions in matters such as
Soobramoney,34 Grootboom,35 TAC and KosaY are by now well known, having been
the subject of debate for around a decade already3 It is, however, important to
summarise the key features of such judgments for readers who may not yet have
considered their impact abroad. The more recent judgment in Mazibukol9 also
warrants discussion, and is considered below.

31
32

Liebenberg, supra note 29, at 52.
Liebenberg, supranote 29, at 52. See also, section I(d), CONSTITUTION and Constitutional
Principle VI to the Interim Constitution.
33 Liebenberg, supra note 29, at 53.
34 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).
35 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
36 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
37 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC).
38 Avinash Govindjee, The Role of the Courts in Addressing Poverty, Inequality and
Unemployment in South Africa 8(2) SoCio-LECAL REvW1w 55 (2012).
39 Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg, 2010 (4) SA I(CC). Readers may also consider the
judgment in Nokotyana v. Ekhurhuleni Municipality, 20104 BCLR 312 (CC) and Beja
v. Premier of the Western Cape, 2011 3 All SA 401 (WCC).
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A. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KZN
Soobramoney was a diabetic suffering from various life-threatening conditions
involving failure of the kidneys. He approached the Court for an order directing a
public hospital to provide him with ongoing dialysis treatment. His condition was
irreversible and his life could only be prolonged (not saved) by the regular renal
dialysis treatment which he sought. Unfortunately, the hospital in question, because
of a lack of resources, only had a limited number of dialysis machines available
and could accordingly only treat a limited number of patients. As Soobramone/s
condition made him ineligible for a kidney transplant, the hospital policy was to
disallow him from accessing dialysis treatment (because the machines were better
served assisting people who were eligible for the transplant). The Constitutional
Court was asked to adjudicate whether Soobramoney was entitled to receive
dialysis treatment in terms of everyone's constitutional right not to be refused
emergency medical treatment and the right to health care.
The Constitutional Court acknowledged the reality of high poverty, levels
of unemployment, inadequate social security and general lack of access to health
services, some of which has been reflected above. The Court came to the conclusion
that the realisation of the wide variety of socio-economic rights which had been
promised by the Constitution was dependent upon the availability of resources.
An unqualified obligation to meet the needs of everyone immediately was not
possible. The Court held that the purpose of affording everyone the right not to be
refused emergency medical treatment was to ensure that necessary and available
treatment was provided immediately in order to avert harm. The type of longlasting treatment sought by Soobramoney did not constitute an 'emergency' in this
context. The State had presented evidence demonstrating that additional funds
and resources could not be allocated to the hospital. Allowing the applicant and
others in a similar condition to receive the dialysis treatment would collapse the
already over-extended resources of the State and indeed the entire health care
system itself. The difficult decisions regarding budgetary allocations were to be
made by the State in a holistic fashion and the Court promised that it would be
slow to interfere with rationaldecisions taken in goodfaith by authorities responsible
for such matters. As in Soobramoney's case, the consequence of this reality would
be that the interests of particular individuals in society would occasionally have to
give way to the larger needs of society. The State, in the circumstances, was held
not to have breached its constitutional obligations, and Soobramoney's application
was dismissed.
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B. Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom
In this case, a group of poor residents had been rendered homeless as a
result of their eviction from privately owned land. Prior to their occupation of the
private land, they lived in Wallacedene, an informal squatter camp. About half the
population were children, a quarter of households had no income and more than
two thirds earned less than R500 per month; they all lived in shacks. Residents
of Wallacedene lacked basic services such as water, sewage and refuse removal
services. The intolerable conditions prompted their migration to the new area, the
private property from which they were later evicted.
Following their eviction, the group applied to the High Court (a court of
lower status than the Constitutional Court) for an order requiring the government
to provide them with adequate basic shelter or accommodation until they could
obtain permanent accommodation. Evidence before the Court showed that the
people had nowhere else to go. The High Court ordered the government to provide
children, accompanied by their parents, with shelter. The government challenged
the correctness of this decision.
The Constitutional Court confirmed that sections 26(1) and 26(2) of the
Constitution (providing for the right of access to housing and the State's obligations
to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources,
to achieve the progressive realisation of the right) were related and must be read
together. Though not expressly stipulated, there exists a negative obligation upon
the State and other entities to refrain from preventing or impairing the right to
access to adequate housing. Subsection 2 placed a positive obligation upon the State:
the State was required to take reasonable legislative and other measures within its
available resources to achieve progressive realisation of the right. 4
In the case of housing, this obligation was shared by all spheres of government.
A reasonable programme must clearly allocate responsibilities to the different
spheres of government and ensure that appropriate financial and human resources
were available. 41 Legislative measures were, on their own, insufficient to comply
with the constitutional mandate. The State must act to achieve the envisaged
results.- For example, measures to establish a public housing programme must
be directed towards progressive realisation of the right. The State was, however,
40
41
42

Grootboom, supranote 35, at 1 39.
Grootboorm, supranote 35, at 1 40.
Grootboom, supra note 35, at 1 42,
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not obliged to immediately realise the right on demand, The government housing
plan did not reasonably make provision to facilitate access to temporary relief for
people who have no access to land, had no roof over their heads and who were
living in intolerable conditions. The programme was held to be not flexible enough
to respond to the needs of people in such situations.
The Constitutional Court concluded that all spheres of government were
to cooperate and devise a coordinated public housing plan which properly took
cognisance of the need to provide immediate relief and accommodation for persons
in emergency situations. Access to immediate and temporary accommodation
included the provision of water and other basic facilities. The State was ordered
to revise its housing plan for the area concerned in order to ensure that the plan
reasonably contemplated and provided for the various considerations raised.
C. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign
HIV/AIDS, has been acknowledged to be a major challenge facing South
African society and qualifies as a government priority. As a result, the government
implemented a programme which consisted of establishing a series of testing
and research centres. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) a non-government
association, brought an application before the High Court to force the government
to make the antiretroviral drug Nevirapine generally available (i.e. even outside
testing and research centres) and to develop a coherent programme to deal with
HI V/AIDS. The High Court found that the government programme to combat HIV/
AIDS fell short of the constitutionally mandated standard in two material aspects:
1.

The refusal to make Nevirapine generally available where attending doctors
considered it medically indicated; and

2.

Failure to set out a time frame for a national programme to prevent motherto-child transmissions through the administration of Nevirapine.

The government appealed to the Constitutional Court. The Court found
the government's policy to be inflexible. Mothers and their new born children at
public hospitals and clinics outside the research and training sites were denied
the opportunity of receiving a single dose of Nevirapine which was potentially a
lifesaving drug at the time of birth of the child. Whereas Nevirapine was available
exclusively for research and training sites, the drug could be administered within
the State's available resources, with no known harm to the mother and child at
public health institutions where testing and counselling was available.
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The Constitutional Court accordingly confirmed the High Court's finding:
the government's policy relating to the limited use of Nevirapine at research and
training sites constituted a breach of constitutional rights. Implicit in the Court's
finding was that the waiting period before taking a decision to make the drug
generally available was not reasonable within the meaning of section 27(2) of the
Constitution.
The Court also had to review the government's programme to determine
whether measures taken in respect of the prevention of mother-to-child HIV
transmission were reasonable. Restricting the use of Nevirapine to research and
training sites was held to be unreasonable because hospitals and clinics with testing
and counselling facilities could easily be equipped to prescribe Nevirapine where
this was medically necessary.
With respect to the separation of powers divide, the Constitutional Court
confirmed that policy-making remained the executive's prerogative (and not that
of the courts). As a result, the courts would be slow to make orders that had the
effect of requiring the executive to pursue a particular policy. The Court emphasised
the duty of each arm of government to respect and be sensitive to the separation
of powers ideal. Significantly, however, this doctrine did not restrain the courts
completely from making orders that impacted on policy. The courts' primary
duty remained to the Constitution and law, which they were obliged to apply
impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. The Constitution required the
State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. Where
State policy was challenged as being inconsistent with the Constitution, courts had
to consider whether the State, in formulating and implementing such policy, had
given effect to its constitutional obligations. Crucially, in as so far as this constituted
an intrusion into the executive domain, the Constitutional Court held that such an
intrusion was constitutionally mandated.
In the circumstances, the government was ordered to devise and implement,
within its available resources, a comprehensive and coordinated programme to
progressively realise the rights of pregnant women and their new born children
to have access to health care services and to combat mother-to-children HIV
transmissions. This programme had to include reasonable measures for counselling
and testing and the State was ordered, without delay, to remove restrictions that
prevented Nevirapine from being made available at public hospitals and clinics.

Adjudication of Socio-Economic Rights by the ConstitutionalCourt of South Africa
D. Khosa and Others v. Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule
and Another v. Minister of Social Development
The applicants in these cases were destitute permanent residents (not citizens)
of South Africa who would have qualified for social assistance (in terms of the
Social Assistance Act 2004) but for the fact that this Act reserved social grants
for 'citizens'. The main contention before the Constitutional Court was that the
citizenship requirement in section 3 of the Social Assistance Act was inconsistent
with section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution, in terms of which the State was obliged
to provide access to social assistance to everyone. It was argued that the limitation
constituted an infringement of the right to equality and did not pass muster under
the general limitations clause of the Constitution.
Although the State argued that it did not possess sufficient budgetary
resources to extend social assistance benefits to permanent residents, the Court
rejected this argument by looking at the available information, by considering
the amount already spent on social assistance grants for citizens and by noting
the adverse effect of the legislation on permanent residents (who contributed to
the country's fiscus through the payment of tax) who required state assistance in
times of need. The exclusion of permanent residents from the social assistance
system was, therefore, held to be unfairly discriminatory and the applicants were
considered to be part of a vulnerable group who were worthy of protection.
Accordingly, the exclusion of permanent residents by section 3 of the Social
Assistance Act was found to be inconsistent with section 27 of the Constitution.
The Court's declaration of invalidity was coupled with reading in the words 'or
permanent residents' into the relevant section so that permanent residents could
apply for social assistance in future.
D. Mazibuko for Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others
Operation Gcin'amazi, a project of the city of Johannesburg, was implemented
to address severe problems of water losses and non-payment for services in Soweto,
a poor community situated in Johannesburg. The project involved re-laying water
pipes to improve water supply and installing pre-paid meters to charge for use of
water in excess of the monthly free basic water allowance per household, which
was fixed at six kiloliters. The applicants, who were residents of Phiri, Soweto,
challenged the city's basic water supply together with the lawfulness of the
installation of prepaid water meters in Phiri. The High Court held the installation
of pre-paid water meters was unlawful and unfair and that the city's free basic
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water policy was unreasonable. It ruled that the city should provide fifty litres of
free basic water daily to Phiri residents and people in similar situations.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that 42 litres per day was
'sufficient water' in terms of the Constitution and directed the city to formulate
policy in light of this finding. The installation of pre-paid water meters was held
to be unconstitutional. The applicants appealed to the Constitutional Court and
sought reinstatement of the more favourable High Court order.
The applicants firstly contended that the Court should determine a quantified
amount of water as 'sufficient water' within the meaning of section 27 of the
Constitution (which affords everyone the right to have access to sufficient food and
water) and that this amount should be set at fifty litres of free water per person
per day. The Constitutional Court refused the invitation to set a 'minimum core'
amount of free basic water, once again restricting its role to an assessment of the
reasonableness of State conduct. The State, the Court held, was constitutionally
obliged to take reasonable legislative and other measures in order to progressively
realise the achievement of the right of access to sufficient water within its available
resources.
The Court's judgment in Mazibuko reflects that, ordinarily, it is of the view
that it would be institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine both what
the content of a particular social economic right entails and the precise steps that
the government should take to ensure progressive realisation of the right. Courts
should, in terms of this approach, only enforce the positive obligations imposed
on the government if the government takes no steps or adopts measures that are
unreasonable. 43 The Court concluded, in the circumstances, that the six kilolitres
of free water per household per month (which amount could be progressively
increased over time) was not unreasonable. The argument that the introduction of
a prepaid water system in Soweto discriminated unfairly against poor black South
Africans also failed. This was on the basis that the government had the authority to
decide how to provide essential services, so long as the mechanisms chosen were
44
reasonable, lawful and not unfairly discriminatory.

43
44

Mazibuko, supranote 39, at
Mazibuko, supra note 39, at

52.
157.
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IV. A

CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND A GLANCE AHEAD: WILL THE
TIGHTROPE WALK CONTINUE?

By and large, it is generally accepted that the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa offers some of the richest defences tojusticiable
socio-economic rights in the world, and that the judgments have themselves
resulted in positive changes for some of the most impoverished people in the
country. The brief, oft-repeated survey of landmark socio-economic rights cases*
provides a snapshot of the adjudicative approach presently being adopted. It
also illustrates the complex balancing act which the Constitutional Court is being
required to perform in South Africa. Perhaps understandably, the difficult work of
the Court has resulted in tensions between the executive and judiciary emerging.
Predictably, it has also proved to be impossible to please all critics. In the broader
African context, for example, it has been argued that judiciaries must play the role
of social reformers, often necessitating activism in order for such an endeavour
to succeed:4
Judges must use their judicial power in order to give social justice
to the poor and economically and socially disadvantaged. South
Africa is best equipped to do this. Its bill of rights contains social and
economic rights. In interpreting those provisions which protect social
and economic rights, judges should remember that they cannot remain
aloof from the social and economic needs of the disadvantaged.
Through their activism, judges can nudge their governments so that
they move forward and improve the social and economic conditions
of the poor. In South Africa the bill of rights is, without interpretation,
activist in its own right. However, it requires activist judges to make
its provisions living realities.
In fact, it is suggested that the 'activist' nature of the South African
Constitution makes it easier for judges to deliver judgments which positively
impact the situation of the most vulnerable members of society, without themselves
becoming "activist" in their approach.17 Somewhat strangely, there has nevertheless

been a paucity of cases relating to socio-economic rights protection, which has
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resulted in the available jurisprudence being criticised for demonstrating a stunted
growth.' Khosa is one of the few cases where some measure of activism might be
discerned. The manner in which the Court dealt with the lack of resources argument
presented by the State resulted in it involving itself in an area which traditionally
would be left to the domain of the executive. Nevertheless, Khosa was essentially
a case concerned with equality and the Court was aided by a poorly prepared
State response to the challenge of differentiating between citizens and a limited
category of permanent residents.
The Court has, in addition and somewhat contrastingly, also been criticised
for being overly deferential to the executive at times. For example, Brand suggests
that the strategy of deference amounts to a failure in the democracy-related aspect
4
of the transformative duty of courts: 9
...
judicial deference not only reflects a limited understanding of
democracy at odds with the Constitution's substantive participatory
vision of democracy, it also replicates the depoliticisation of issues
of poverty that routinely occurs in other spheres of society and so
actively works against rather than promotes the political capacity
of impoverished people and the "establishment of a ..democratic
society"' in the constitutional sense.
King, citing Kavanagh, has noted an increased Anglo-Canadian focus on the
idea of 'judicial deference', ultimately linking judicial concern for deference to a
concern "about the limits of their institutional role in the constitutionalframewor"'.S
Kavanagh defines 'deference' to mean "a matter of ssigningweight to thejudgment of
another,either where it is at variancewith one's own assessment,or where one is uncertain
of what the correct assessment should be".51 She differs, according to King, between

minimal deference, which is always owed, and substantial deference, which is
to be earned by the decision-maker when the judge recognises his / her own
'institutional shortcomings' in respect of an issue. The three main situations where
this may occur are when there is a deficit of institutional competence, expertise or
institutional or democratic legitimacy, in addition to defer.5 2
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A set of institutional concerns (about the institutional capacity, legitimacy,
integrity and security of courts and about separation of powers requirements)
have influenced the (deferential) development of South African courts' approach
to deciding socio-economic rights cases." TAC and Mazibuko are the cases which,
according to critics, demonstrate a measure of unwanted deference on the part
of the court. As Brand argues, from the perspective of claimants, deference has
up to now in South African socio-economic rights jurisprudence operated as an
obstacle to effective enforcement, leading in those cases where claims are successful
to attenuated forms of relief and, with specific reference to Mazibuko, explicitly
forming the basis for rejection of claims. 4 As the Court held in Mazibuko:5
... ordinarily it is institutionally inappropriate for a court to determine
precisely what the achievement of any particular social and economic
right entails and what steps government should take to ensure the
progressive realisation of the right. This is a matter, in the first place,
for the legislature and executive, the institutions of government best
placed to investigate social conditions in the light of available budgets
and to determine what targets are achievable in relation to social
and economic rights. Indeed, it is desirable as a matter of democratic
accountability that they should do so for it is their programmes and
promises that are subjected to democratic popular choice.
The Constitutional Court has, according to Brand, neither left alone difficult
questions relating to the separation of powers nor engaged with such issues, but
has instead deliberately deferred those issues for decision to the other branches
of government. s 6 This deference has operated in practically all aspects of socioeconomic rights jurisprudence, such as the choice of which questions to engage
with, the formulation of standards and tests and as a strategy to avoid or account
for institutional problems in relation to remedies.-"
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The Constitutional Court's consistent rejection of the minimum core argument
has, in addition, been a source of contention,. and may prove to be a terrain of
dispute in the years to come. This is because South Africa has recently made
reference to its intention to ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights [Hereinafter, "ICESCR"]. Article 2 of the Covenant imposes
a duty on all parties to "take steps ... to the maximum of its available resource, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realisationof the rights recognised in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures". This principle of progressive realisation, far from rendering the Covenant
meaningless, has been interpreted by the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights as imposing minimum core obligations to provide at least minimum
essential levels of each of the rights. The Constitutional Court must surely revisit
its prior rejection of this notion once the ICESCR is ratified, given South Africa's
obligation to consider international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights5 9

V. CONCLUSION
A court's main function in a constitutional democracy is to adjudicate various,
vague (and often qualified) constitutional obligations by assessing the justifications
put forward by the State for compliance with such obligations.w° The vagueness of
this task necessitates a theory of judicial restraintP which is somewhere between
an activist mindset on the part of judges seeking to 'legislate' social rights for
people in need, on the one hand, and an overly deferential approach which leaves
all difficult issues involving social rights to other branches of government on the
other hand. In analysing and appreciating various considerations impacting an
appropriate theory of judicial restraint, King concludes that the role for judges in
constitutional social rights adjudication ought ordinarily to proceed incrementally: 2
Judges, on this view, ought to take small steps either by particularising
their judgments, or, when reviewing policies that apply to a broad or
macro-level set of interests, would impose constraints to the decisionmaking process that leave substantial room for future adaptation.
This approach is a dynamic, searching process, one that seeks out
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feedback and takes new steps based on the wisdom culled from
previous steps.. .That role may appear restrained to some. People will
want more from the courts, and even accuse judges of denying the
promise of a new constitution Yet the true concern of any advocate
of social rights must be that people are secured their social human
rights and social citizenship rights in the best of available ways. Legal
avenues can only work effectively if they complement and ultimately
collaborate with other institutions, even if that involves prodding
those institutions into action.
Service delivery failure and general lack of progress has led to agitation at
grass-roots level in the country. Although recourse to the courts is not always the
route followed in seeking to address the problems of South African society, people
in desperate need appear to be increasingly utilising the courts in circumstances
where they feel that the other arms of government have failed them. This has
resulted in courts being increasingly drawn into issues where resource constraints
lie at the heart of the matter in dispute, such as disputes involving the eviction of
squatters and the responsibility of the State to provide reasonable accommodation.
The extent to which courts are able to directly influence living conditions in the
country on a large-scale, without resorting to activism, is questionable. Rather,
the courts appear to be comfortable to vindicate and give effect to the ambitious,
transformative spirit of the Constitution in a manner which does not trample on the
domain of the executive. One reason for this, practically speaking, must surely be
the concern that over-reaching on the part of the judiciary might eventually result in
total non-compliance with court orders, resulting in a form of a constitutional crisis.
In seeking to strike an appropriate balance, the judiciary does well to participate
in the transformation of society in a manner which safeguards the foundational
values of a democratic society. Constitutional interpretation must surely (continue
to) occur within a holistic framework, set against the backdrop of the values of South
African society, and in light of an emergent national sense of justice. Judgments of
the court may, in this fashion, justifiably continue to have budgetary implications
without themselves being directed towards the rearrangement of budgets. The
response of the bench to challenging situations involving poverty and deprivation
has certainly not been muted, and has gone far beyond the repetition of well-known
platitudes and 'austere formalism'. Rather than resort to activism, the courts have
restrained themselves in accordance with the constitutional principles which they
continuously seek to uphold. It is suggested, in conclusion, that courts ought to
continue not to shy away from challenging cases involving socio-economic rights.
By remaining true to the values of the Constitution, courts in South Africa may
continue the search for substantive social justice in a manner which vindicates the
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very design of the Constitution itself, Courts must appreciate that people resort to
this forum as a result of unresponsiveness or other failings on the part of the more
'democratic' branches of government. It would certainly enhance the ordinary
understanding of their approach if more attention was paid to providing normative
clarity regarding the actual content of socio-economic rights - a matter which is
usually sidestepped by proceeding immediately to a reasonableness / limitations
analysis and by focusing on the conduct of the State, rather than the content of the
right itself. International law obligations on South Africa may, as indicated above,
assist in moving the courts towards a new, more clearly defined role in respect of
providing meaningful content for socio-economic rights.

